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ABSTRACT  
Purpose: This study sets out to identify effective interventions to reduce child marriage, to estimate their 
economic benefits achieved through enhanced productivity and to undertake a benefit/cost analysis of the 
interventions.  
Methods:  We model the effects of a set of identified child marriage and education interventions for 31 low and 
middle-income countries,1 focusing on the reduction in child marriage rates and increasing secondary school 
attendance and completions. These lead to higher productivity which generates increased GDP per capita. The 
comparison of these benefits with the costs of the interventions generates benefit-cost ratios (BCRs).  
Results: Both types of interventions have significant effects on marriage rates for girls aged 15–17 years which 
fall from 13.2% in 2015 to 5.2% in 2050. Both interventions lead to sharp increases in school attendance and 
secondary completion which is 19.3% points higher by 2030. The productivity improvement is 22.7% by 2030. 
The average BCR for the 31 countries is 7.4 (standard deviation of 1.0) at a 3% discount rate. 
 
Conclusions: The results indicate that there are substantial economic gains to reducing child marriage by specific 
child marriage and education interventions.  
 
Implications and Contribution 
Programs to reduce child marriage can start with the community or with the school. Some programs seek to 
change community attitudes, to improve girls’ life skills and to provide incentives to families, while others set out 
to make schools more effective in educating and retaining girls. This paper shows that both approaches can be 
effective, and that when applied together can sharply reduce child marriage, with a high benefit-cost ratio.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Child marriage is defined as a legal or customary union that occurs before the age of 18, although laws can vary 
between countries and genders [1]. It is illegal in most countries and is also a violation of a number of UN human 
rights conventions.2 Even so, in the 55 developing countries for which data are available, over 30% of girls are 
married before they turn 18 years of age [2]. 
 
A complex range of factors contribute to child marriage and are well documented in the literature. One of the most 
significant is prevailing social and cultural norms [1,3–5], often arising from the complex relationship between 
religious beliefs and socio-cultural practices [6]. Another is poverty, as is attested by higher prevalence rates in 
the poorest regions [7]. Where resources are limited, girls suffer more from truncated educational opportunities 
and are married early as a safeguard against premarital sex [1]. Poor parents justify marrying girls early to 
‘secure’ their economic future [8], or regard them as an economic commodity and a way of settling familial debts 
or disputes [9]. Hence, changing community norms is paramount in reducing child marriage rates as well as 
ameliorating the effects of poverty and improving girls’ life skills and educational levels to enable them to be 
economically independent. 
  
Child marriage has a range of adverse inter-related health, education and economic impacts, on which there is an 
extensive literature. This demonstrates a strong correlation between child marriage, lower educational outcomes 
and reduced levels of literacy [10–14]. Child marriage is highest among the least educated [1]. It is also an 
important reason for early dropout from school [15]. Although estimates vary by country, child marriage and 
pregnancies typically account for 15–33% of dropouts [12,16]. Similarly, delayed marriage leads to higher skill 
levels [10,14,16].  Low education outcomes lead to reduced economic participation [17], including the exclusion 
from paid employment [3, 18]. The ability to complete secondary education increases girls’ learning and their 
earnings potential, generating better employment outcomes and productivity gains [19]. For adolescent girls being 
in school and being married is almost completely mutually exclusive [19]. Not only is the education of early-
married mothers poor, but also that of their children [20–23]. 
 
                                                            
1  The data necessary to model the child marriage impact are available only for 31 such countries. These are as follows: Low-income 
country group: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe. Middle-income country group: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, India, Kenya, 
Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, South Africa, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Zambia. 
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and 
Registration of Marriages (1962), The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) and The International Conference on Population and Development Programme of Action 
(1994) [3:2].  
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Given existing knowledge of the causes and implications of child marriage, this paper reviews the evidence on the 
cost and effectiveness of specific child marriage interventions. It also discusses the evidence base for a set of 
education options which, by reducing secondary school dropout rates, act to reduce marriage rates. The reduction 
in marriage rates and related improvements in education lead to employment and productivity benefits.  Given the 
diversity of impacts of child marriage, there is a wide range of economic and social benefits from reducing its 
incidence. This study focuses on one specific class of economic benefits, those arising from the employment and 
productivity benefits of improved schooling outcomes. We recognise that this assumption may understate the true 
social BCR, and that other benefits should be considered in a more complete analysis.  
 
Substantial efforts have been made by researchers to develop, implement and evaluate programs to prevent child 
marriage and to mitigate its harmful effects. Not least of these are studies led by Malhotra, Kalamar and Wodon. 
Malhotra’s systematic analysis of the efforts to discourage child marriage identified five core approaches that are 
being implemented; their findings on the lessons learned so far has been cited by several studies [7,8,20]. This 
study builds on the contributions of these researchers and uses their approach [24] to identify interventions that 
mobilise communities, enhance access to education and improve life skills. 
 
To our knowledge, there has been no previous cost-benefit analysis of interventions for child marriage, nor has 
there been an evaluation of the productivity benefits of reducing child marriage. The recent study by Wodon et al. 
valued the welfare benefit of ending child marriage at $556 billion per annum, as the welfare benefit from reduced 
population growth by 2030 [7]. However, that study did not consider the interventions required to eliminate child 
marriage, and hence did not provide any cost-benefit analysis. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Modelling framework 
 
There are several components of the modelling framework used here (see Figure 1). First, we use parameters 
derived from the literature to estimate the impact of interventions on the child marriage rate, as well as the costs of 
the interventions. As shown in Figure 1, three of those interventions have direct impacts on the child marriage 
rate, while four have indirect impacts through the effect of educational interventions on school attendance, and 
hence on child marriage rates. The second step is to estimate, for the direct interventions, the impact of reduced 
child marriage on educational outcomes, notably early dropout, years of schooling and extent of completion of 
secondary schooling. The third step is to estimate one key element of the economic benefit of the better 
educational outcomes for the girls concerned: higher productivity and access to better employment, leading to 
higher levels of GDP per capita. The results of these analyses are brought together in a cost-benefit analysis.  
 
Figure 1. Modelling framework: Estimating the benefit-cost ratios for the interventions to reduce child marriage. 
 
 
For girls who stay longer in school because of the educational interventions, we assume that reduced dropout 
occurs in the same proportion among those who would otherwise have been married or unmarried out of school. 
We define β as the proportion of girls of this age who are not in school who are married. Hence the reduction in 
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child marriage is equal to β times the reduction in dropout. We also apply this β parameter to apportion both a 
share of the total costs of the educational interventions, and a share of the benefits of the improved educational 
outcomes from these, to child marriage reductions. In the modelling reported here, we use estimated country-
specific values β for 2018 throughout the simulation period, while recognising that in more complete analysis 
these values would be calculated for each country in each period. 
 
Choice and characteristics of interventions 
 
Specific child marriage interventions 
In the peer-reviewed literature search, Pub Med and Web of Science were searched from 2006 onwards and only 
from English language sources. The initial search for (“child marriage” or “early marriage”) produced 502 results 
in Web of Science and 547 in Pub Med. These results were refined to the terms (impact* or intervention* or trial* 
or evaluation*) resulting in 172 results in Web of Science and 244 in Pub Med. These two sets were combined 
(416 articles) and 80 duplicates were removed leaving 336 possibly relevant articles. The abstracts of this set were 
reviewed and 62 were identified (30 in Web of Science and 32 in Pub Med). A final set of 14 articles was chosen. 
The range of reasons for excluding articles included being related to prevalence and not interventions, or being 
focused on the determinants of child marriage rather than interventions to prevent child marriage. 
 
The grey literature was searched on Google Scholar, university library catalogues, and the websites of relevant 
national and international agencies. We then hand-searched the literature based on citations in the identified 
articles in both the peer-reviewed and grey literature.  
 
Two of the papers identified in the literature search were review articles of interventions [24, 25]. 
 
Malhotra et al. [25] identified 23 evaluated child marriage prevention programs. They identified five main 
effective strategies (often combining multiple strategies) for delaying marriage or preventing child marriage. The 
strategies identified were: (1) empowering girls with information, skills and support networks (generally termed 
life skills); (2) educating and mobilizing parents and community members (community mobilisation); (3) 
enhancing the accessibility and quality of formal schooling for girls (economic options); (4) offering economic 
support and incentives for girls and their families (economic incentives and subsidies); and (5) fostering and 
enabling legal and policy framework. 
 
Kalamar et al. [24] assessed and ranked the intervention studies according to comprehensive criteria. High quality 
intervention studies were those that were detailed, rigorous and well designed, which included intervention impact 
measurement, and employed randomization and pre-post comparisons.  
 
These two reviews provided a framework for selecting interventions. Malhotra et al. [25] identified the main 
effective strategies and Kalamar et al. [24] provided an evaluation benchmark for each study. A final list of six 
articles closest to meeting these criteria and used in the modelling was extracted from the formal search process 
and is presented in Table 1, which includes costs and outcomes that were available of interventions.  
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Table 1  
Results of literature search: Interventions to delay marriage and reduce child marriage rates  
Study; program; 
country 
Targeting Main intervention 
components 
Costs Method Impact/Outcomes 
Zibani in Sewall-
Menon & Bruce (2012) 
[26]; 
Ishraq;  
Upper Egypt 
Disadvantaged 
out-of-school, 
rural adolescent 
girls aged 12–15 
Life skills 
Community mobilisation 
Life skills costs per girl 
$17.99 
Admin costs pro rata 
$13.50 
Total costs $31.50 
Monitored & evaluated with surveys of 
intervention villages & control villages 
with no intervention 
 
No results at time of study but indicators developed & program 
scaled-up. 
Brady et al. (2007) 
[27]; 
Ishraq; 
Upper Egypt 
Disadvantaged 
out-of-school, 
rural adolescent 
girls in 4 rural 
villages – 2 in 
Ishraq, 2 control 
Social norms 
Safe spaces 
 Longitudinal surveys of girls aged 13–
15  
  
Marriage rates at endline among non-participants in program villages 
are higher than in control villages (22% vs 16%). Rate of 13–29 
months participating 12 %, with full-time participants 5%. 
Erulkar & Methungi 
(2009) [28]; 
Berhane Hewan; 
Ethiopia 
Married & 
unmarried girls 
aged 10–19. 
Community mobilisation 
Girls’ education incentives 
Conditional economic 
incentives, e.g. chickens or 
goat 
 
Cost of materials such as 
pencils, notebooks $US4 
Provision of 
goat/pregnant ewe (at 
cost of $US20) if girl 
unmarried at age 18 
Baseline & endline (2 years later) of 2 
villages with similar SES profiles – 1 
program & other control; Chi-square 
tests, proportional hazards models & 
logistic regressions 
Improvements in girls’ school enrolment, age at marriage, etc. 
Particularly for girls 10–14 in program rather than in control area, 
more likely to be in school (odds ratio, 3.0) & less likely to have ever 
been married (0.1).  But, girls aged 15–19 in intervention, elevated 
likelihood of having been married by endline (2.4). 
Erulkar (2014) [29]; 
Berhane Hewan; 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Girls aged 10–14 
 
Community mobilisation 
Girls’ education incentives 
Conditional economic 
incentives, e.g. chickens or 
goat 
 
Full model costs  in 
Ethiopia $44 per girl 
Full model costs in 
Tanzania $117 per girl 
Quasi-experimental research design, 
with population-based surveys before 
& after implementation, in intervention 
& control sites 
In Ethiopia: Education support, 94% less likely to get married at 
endline. 
2 chickens for every year unmarried, girls 15–17yrs were 50% likely. 
Full model, girls aged 15–17 yrs, were two-thirds less likely to be 
married. 
In Tanzania: With goats, girls 5–17 yrs, two thirds less likely to be 
married. Full model positive effect among both groups of girls. 
Erulkar et al. (2017) 
[30]; 
Berhane Hewan 
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia 
& Tanzania 
Cross section of 
men, women 
adolescent males 
& females 
 
Community mobilisation 
Girls’ education incentives 
Conditional economic 
incentives 
Conditional cash transfer 
cost in: 
Ethiopia $32 
Tanzania $107 
Average $69.50 
Population-based base line & endline 
surveys of girls aged 12–17 & parents 
of girls 
 
In Ethiopia: among girls aged 15–17, with conditional asset transfer 
half the risk of being married at endline compared to baseline RR = 
0.57 
In Tanzania: RR = 0.52 
Community dialogue in Burkina Faso ARR =.33 (0.19,0.50)*** 
Community sensitization in Tanzania 0.74 (0.43, 1.27) 
Community dialogue in Ethiopia 0.81 (0.60,1.09) 
Education promotion in Ethiopia 0.78 (0.46, 1.31) 
ARR: Adjusted for age, religion, ethnicity and socioeconomic status 
Pande et al. (2006), 
Pande et al. (n.d.) 
[31,32]; 
Life skills course in 
rural Maharashtra; 
India 
Girls aged 12–18 
not in school or 
working  
1-year program with life skills 
as one-hour sessions each 
weekday evening 
  
 Logistic regression analysis of data 
collected from program & control 
(randomly selected) villages 
Steady decrease in proportion of marriage in girls 11–17 yrs between 
1997 & 2001 in intervention. No significant change in control. 
Randomly selected control 4 times more likely married before 18 
than those on full program. Pre-18 marriage rate only 9% for full 
participants & almost a third for control group. 
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We selected the studies of cost and effectiveness from Table 1, which met the criteria suggested by 
Kalamar et al. [24] and conformed to the framework of interventions provided by Malhotra et al. [25], to 
model the direct child marriage interventions.  
 
Table 2 provides details of the sources for the intervention programs considered for inclusion in the child 
marriage modelling. 
 
Table 2 
Sources of evidence for intervention programs considered for modelling 
Intervention programs  Source of evidence 
Life Skills Ishraq (Sewall-Menon & Bruce 2012 [33]; Brady et al. 2007 [29]); Maharashtra Life Skills 
(Pande et al. 2006 [31]; Pande et al. n.d. [32]) 
Community Mobilisation Berhane Hewan (Erulkar et al. 2017 [30]; Erulkar and Methungi 2009 [28]). 
Conditional Economic Incentives Berhane Hewan (Erulkar et al. 2017 [30]; Erulkar 2014 [29];  
Education Incentives Conn (2016) [34]; Snilstveit et al. (2016) [35] 
Legal & Policy Framework Outside the domain of this study 
 
The life skills, community mobilisation and conditional economic incentives which form part of the 
specific child marriage interventions and together with the education incentives are discussed below.  
 
The ‘Life Skills’ programs were represented by the Maharashtra program [31,32] and the ‘Life Skills’ 
component of the Ishraq program [27,33], which includes education about marriage, pregnancy, violence 
against women and other topics [33]. The most detailed information for community mobilisation and 
conditional economic incentives was available for the Berhane Hewan program [28,30]. 
 
In the Maharashtra Life Skills program, the pre-18 marriage rate for those girls who participated fully in 
the life skills program was only 9%, compared with the control group of almost one-third, a reduction of 
over 70% [32]. Moreover, the odds ratio of the control group to marry before 18 was 4.0, compared with 
those who fully attended the life skills course [31]. For the Life Skills component of the Ishraq program 
evaluated by Brady et al. [29], the marriage rate at endline among non-participants in Ishraq program 
villages (control group) was 22%, compared with the rate among those participating full time for 13 to 29 
months of 5%, a 77% reduction. Pande et al. [31] and Brady et al. [27] both acknowledge the likelihood 
of selection bias in these comparisons and other unobserved variables. Accordingly, we used 35% as 
representing a conservative effectiveness rate, based on the data, together with two sensitivity rates of 
25% and 45%. The cost of the Life Skills interventions was based on the Ishraq program and was $31.503 
per girl ($17.99 plus pro-rata administrative costs of $13.50) [33]. 
 
Community mobilisation interventions seek to change the social norms by persuading parents and the 
community more generally to delay marriage and create a supportive environment for those girls who 
choose to do so [25], and these are widely used. The best study of the costs and impact of such 
interventions is by Erulkar et al. [30] conducted in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Tanzania. The study 
compared girls in the intervention programs with a control group for each country at base line and end 
line. The program conducted in Burkino Faso was highly effective at reducing marriage for 15–17 year 
olds compared with the control group. The adjusted risk ratio for girls never married at the study endline 
was 0.33 (0.19, 0.60) significant at 99.9%. Unfortunately, the ratios for the other two countries were not 
significant at 95%. However, both showed reductions in the marriage rate with adjusted odds ratios of 
0.74 (0.43, 1.27) and 0.81 (0.60, 1.09) for Tanzania and Ethiopia, respectively. The average of the results 
for the three countries was 0.64 indicating a reduction in the marriage rate of 36%. Given the uncertainty 
attached to the results we reduced the percentage by one third to 24% for modelling purposes and 
sensitivity tested at 14% and 34%. The average cost per girl for the three countries of $14 [30] was used 
in the model.3 
                                                            
3 Adjusted by country-specific GDP per capita to allow for different cost levels in each country. 
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The Conditional Economic Incentives intervention we used incorporated an animal reward (goat or live 
chickens) for not marrying. It was part of the same program referred to above [30]. This program was 
highly effective at delaying marriage for girls aged 15–17. The more reliable data was for Ethiopia and 
Tanzania. The odds ratio for the program in Ethiopia was 0.57 (0.35, 0.90) and for the program in 
Tanzania, 0.52 (0.30, 0.91), a reduction of 45%. The nature of the reward structure of the intervention left 
it less open to selection bias. Nonetheless, we reduced the modelled effectiveness by one third to 30% and 
sensitivity tested for 20% and 40%. The cost of these programs per girl was $32 in Ethiopia and $107 in 
Tanzania [30]. We took the average of the two, $69.50.3,4  
 
The education interventions 
The education interventions, with an impact on child marriage rates, were derived from a meta-analysis 
undertaken by Conn [34], which was itself a meta-analysis of seven meta-analyses. In all the meta-
analyses combined 49 different types of interventions, and within each type of intervention there were 
multiple studies that each, in turn, apply the intervention differently.  
 
The meta-analysis [34] measured the impact of education interventions, in terms of standard deviations, to 
both increase secondary school access (reduce dropout rates, increase enrolment) and improve learning. 
The particular interventions selected and their impact are sourced from one component meta-analysis 
[35], which considered 26 interventions. These included interventions at the child, household, school, 
teacher and system level. It included school-based health programs, cash transfers, school infrastructure, 
teacher training and incentives and public private partnerships. We selected only those that had an impact 
on access, which we assumed had a direct impact on marriage rates [36, 37]. Those selected had 
favourable impacts on improving enrolment, attendance, and completion, or reducing dropouts in excess 
of 0.1 standard deviations. These are summarised in Table 3 in terms of their standard deviations. 
 
Table 3 
Selected effective interventions for improving adolescent access to education  
Intervention Impact (standard deviations) 
Increase the provision of school in rural areas to give rural girls greater access to 
schools.  
0.38, 95% CI[–0.29, 1.04] 
2 studies 
Improve educational infrastructure such as the provision of girl’s latrines.  0.11, 95% CI[0.01, 0.20] 
4 studies 
Cash transfers to encourage girls to remain in school.  0.12, 95% CI[0.01, 0.22] 
28 studies 
Pedagogical changes/teacher training 0.13, 95% CI[–0.02, 0.28] 
2 studies 
Source: Snilstveit et al. [35].  
 
In modelling the costs of the educational interventions, they are expressed as percentages of the cost of 
the education programs for each country. They are respectively 10%, 5%, 10% and 10% for the above 
interventions [19].The estimates of these costs are based on UNICEF sources.5 
                                                            
4 Each of the costs used in the analysis is the average per girl from each intervention program. Where given, for instance in the 
Ishraq program [33], administration costs represent over 40% of the total. It would be expected that when conducted on a larger 
scale this administrative cost component would fall. If it was to be halved in this case the average per girl would fall to $24.75 
from $31.50, a reduction of over 20%. Providing the effectiveness rates were to be maintained, this would have a significantly 
positive effect on the BCR.   
5 - New community schools – UNICEF [38] Table G.2 cost $11 per student per year for construction, authors doubled these costs 
to account for smaller class sizes; $22 is approximately 10% of costs in LIC. 
- Cash transfers – UNICEF [38] $50 per student per year or 17% of costs in LIC and 8% of costs in LMIC. 
- Improved school infrastructure, latrines – UNICEF [38] Table H.2 $4624 cost of latrines in school of 500 is approximately $10 
per year; or 3% of annual per student costs in LIC countries;  
- Teacher training and pedagogical changes – UNICEF [38] table H.2 shows almost zero costs for improved pedagogy after 
initial training; Conn [34] estimated $23 for training in the Philippines or 10% of primary costs there (taken from projection 
model used by the Education Commission [39]). 
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Education and productivity modelling 
Here we draw on earlier work, with colleagues, reported in [2]. The education modelling starts with a 
standard cohort model of demographic educational attainment, drawing on earlier work of UNESCO 
[40,41]. This module projects to completion a matrix of pupils by grade, age gender and marital status 
over time, dependent on the initial intake, flows to a next grade based on promotion or transition and to 
the same grade in the next year based on repetition rates. The data was compiled from multiple 
international databases, household surveys, national sources or, where missing, estimated based on data 
from other countries. The second component is an intervention module, developed from the Simulations 
for Equity in Education model [38]. Here changes to education outcomes are driven from the bottom up 
by assumptions about intervention coverage and effectiveness and drop out risk factors, such as poverty, 
girl sex, language and minority status via the intermediate drivers of education progress – intake, 
progression, and repetition. The cost of the interventions consists of the cost of the interventions 
themselves and the cost of educating the additional number of students attending through to the final year 
of secondary school. 
 
In the application of the education model here, the direct child marriage interventions lead to higher 
attendance at school, and completions. The educational interventions have direct schooling outcomes 
through the model, and lead to reduced child marriage as discussed above.  
 
The literature distinguishes various channels through which improved education outcomes influence 
economic activity. Both increased years of schooling and better quality schooling lead to higher 
productivity and higher earnings in a given form of employment, while completing secondary school 
offers a better prospect of formal employment. The employment model, reported in [2] and used here, 
draws on parameter estimates from the literature, together with some new empirical work, on the impact 
of better education on the type and level of employment [42–44],and the vast, multi-country literature on 
the impact of the level and quality of employment on productivity and growth [45–47]. The impact of 
better schooling is traced, for each country, through the effects on the future employment paths of the 20–
24 years cohort and through the impact on GDP resulting from those improved employment paths.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Reduction in child marriage rates 
Child marriage rates were estimated for these two sets of interventions, specific child marriage and 
education interventions, relative to a base case without interventions. The child marriage interventions 
show results for three combinations of effectiveness levels—conditional economic incentives (EI) 30%, 
Community mobilisation (ComM) 24%  and Life Skills (LS) 35%, and +/- 10% for the effectiveness of 
each intervention as shown in Figure 2.  Based on the mid-range estimates, EI 30%, ComM 24%, LS 
35%, marriage rates for women aged 15–17 fell by over half for countries studied—from 13.2% in 2017 
to 5.2% in 2050 (see Figure 2). The decline in the base case is mainly due to demographic factors. Of the 
decline relative to the base case, about 45% is due to the child marriage interventions and 39% due to the 
education interventions. The sensitivity analysis indicates that the marriage rates show a similar pattern of 
decline for a range of child marriage intervention levels. 
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Figure 2. Marriage rates, various intervention levels, 15–17 year old girls, selected developing countries, (n=31), 2015 to 2050.  
EI is conditional economic incentives, ComM is community mobilisation and LS is life skills. Source: Author estimates.  
 
Better schooling outcomes and increased productivity 
Table 4 presents schooling and productivity effects for the education and specific child marriage 
interventions. These result in the share of girls aged 20–24 years completing secondary education 
increasing by 24.9 percentage points in low-income countries and 14.8 in middle-income countries, by 
2030. Overall the increase is 19.3 percentage points, a substantial lift in completion rates. The education 
interventions had the larger effect, shifting the percent completing by 13.1 percentage points compared 
with 5.5 for the child marriage interventions  
 
Table 4 
Simulation results: education and productivity gains from specific child marriage and educational interventions for girls (all 
figures are unweighted averages for the countries covered) 
 Low income (n=14) 
Middle income 
(n=17) 
Total 
(n=31) 
(i) Change in educational outcomes relative to the base case in 2030  
Share of 20–24 year olds girls who have completed year 12 (percentage points increase) 
Child marriage (CM) interventions 7.9 3.4 5.5 
Education interventions (CM only) 15.7 10.9 13.1 
Total 24.9 14.8 19.3 
(ii) Productivity effect for 20–24 year old girls (change by 2030, %)  
Child marriage       
Additional years of schooling effect 4.4 1.1 2.6 
Change in employment level and type 6.2 1.8 3.7 
Total 10.8 2.9 6.4 
Education interventions (CM only)    
Additional years of schooling effect 9.3 4.4 6.6 
Change in employment level and type 11.4 5.6 8.2 
Total 21.7 10.2 15.3 
Total CM and educational interventions (CM only)     
Additional years of schooling effect 14.1 5.5 9.4 
Change in employment level and type 18.2 7.4 12.2 
Total 34.9 13.3 22.7 
Source: Author estimates. 
 
The improved schooling outcomes lead to increased productivity. Each additional year of schooling 
provides an economic return by way of increased productivity, and higher secondary completions 
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increases the number of girls employed and the proportion engaged in formal employment [2]. The 
immediate economic effect of increased schooling is negative because it withdraws girls from the 
workforce, but in due course a higher proportion of the cohort enters the workforce in more productive 
roles. The productivity changes are shown in Table 3 for the two productivity effects and the two sets of 
interventions. Overall, the productivity improvement for both sets of interventions is 22.7%, of which 
12.2% is a result of the education interventions and 9.4% for the child marriage interventions.  
 
The change in employment type (increased formal employment) had a larger effect on productivity, as did 
the additional years of schooling. The results also show that there is a much larger productivity effect of 
34.9% for low-income countries, where starting productivity is very low, compared with 13.3 % for 
middle-income countries.  
 
Benefit-cost ratios 
The benefit-cost ratios (BCRs) are calculated as the ratio of the net present value, at a 3% discount rate, of 
the GDP generated, based on increased productivity and employment, to that of the total costs of the 
education and specific child marriage interventions. The modelling assumed that the coverage of the 
interventions would be progressively increased to reach a country-specific target level by 2030 [19]. 
Costs per girl are assumed to increase proportionately, whereas in practice some economies of scale are 
likely to be achieved. The BCRs are calculated on the basis that the interventions will continue to 2030, 
and will provide continuing benefits after that arising from the increased lifetime productivity of the 
cohorts affected. 
 
Table 5 shows the relevant BCRs by country income group for the education and the specific child 
marriage interventions previously discussed. Although there is significant variation between countries, 
average estimated BCRs are high. The unweighted average for the 31 countries is 7.4, with a bootstrap 
standard deviation of 1.0. 
 
Table 5  
Benefit-cost ratios for the impact of education and child marriage interventions arising from employment benefits 
World Bank country income class Benefit-cost ratio 
Low income (n=14) 9.4 
(1.8) 
Middle income (n=17) 5.8 
(1.2) 
Total (n=31)* 7.4 
(1.0) 
Note: Bootstrap standard deviations in brackets. Source: Author estimates.  
 
Sensitivity analysis indicated that while the ratios varied significantly with the intervention levels, they 
remained well above one. For instance, if the effectiveness rates for each of the child marriage 
interventions were increased by 10 percentage points the BCR was 7.7, declining to 7.1 when the child 
marriage interventions were decreased by 10 percentage points. 
 
The BCRs were estimated to average 8.5 for low-income countries. There was a cluster of eight Sub-
Saharan African countries with BCRs of 9 or more indicating a high estimated responsiveness to the 
interventions. Most of these countries had well above average reductions in child marriage rates and 
improvement in school performance, indicating a high level of projected effectiveness of these 
interventions for these countries. For a range of other countries, the interventions were less beneficial. 
The marked response of some countries, and not others, indicates the benefits of a population targeted 
approach to intervention delivery.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
The modelling indicates that selected interventions to reduce child marriage generate significant 
economic benefits in relation to the cost of those interventions. The effectiveness and costs used in the 
model are derived from an extensive search of the literature. Each of the interventions operates either 
directly or indirectly through encouraging girls to increase their years of schooling and complete their 
secondary education. The analysis indicates that both the package of specific child marriage benefits and 
the relevant education have a net positive effect on the girls’ lifetime productivity and likelihood of 
acquiring a job in the formal employment sector. The interventions act to reduce the dropout rate although 
in different ways. The education interventions seek to increase the availability and proximity of schools, 
make them more ‘female friendly’, improve teaching quality and provide incentives for girls to remain at 
school. By keeping girls at school, they reduce the likelihood of early marriage. The child marriage 
interventions seek to change community attitudes to early marriage, better equip girls with life skills and 
finally provide economic incentives to remain unmarried, which provides them with the opportunity to 
stay at school.  
 
Our modelling indicated that this intervention package led to a significant reduction in child marriage 
rates by about half in the period to 2050 compared with the base case, with most of the reduction taking 
place by 2030, and an increase in productivity of over 20% by 2030, with both the child marriage and 
education inventions contributing to this outcome. The selection process for the interventions modelled 
ensured that they were the most effective, and each made an overall positive contribution to the overall 
BCR which varied between countries. 
 
The study suggests that interventions which reduce child marriage through increased attendance at school 
and changing social attitudes to child marriage, are both important in reducing child marriage and should 
be pursued jointly. A more complete study would more fully address the broader systemic health, 
demographic and intergenerational effects of the low status of young women in many developing 
countries. While the knowledge of impact and costs remain imperfect, the BCRs are robust for different 
intervention levels. The interventions are estimated to generate economic and social benefits that are 
many times their costs.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
As with all modelling exercises, the results produced in this paper depend on the assumptions made in 
specifying the relationships between the relevant variables. Some causes of child marriage are not 
modelled. Moreover, the relationships between child marriage, education and employment outcomes are 
complex, and the direction of causation often highly interdependent. It is not possible, given the limited 
evidence, to capture all these relationships. Accordingly, the modelling attempts to incorporate the most 
important of the relationships based on the best understanding we have from the available evidence. 
Nonetheless, this analysis relies on a small number of studies which evaluate these relationships. This is 
particularly true of the specific child marriage programs. The results of these evaluation studies are 
broadly applied to contexts which may be very different from those where the results were produced.  
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